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United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola: When Criminal

Defendants Say No to Drugs
I. INTRODUCTION

In light of the "significant liberty interest in avoiding the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs," 1 the Ninth Circuit
joined several other circuits 2 in requiring the government to meet
the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence when it wants
to forcibly medicate criminal defendants to make them competent to
stand trial. 3
If the government wants to medicate a criminal defendant
against his will, it must proceed in one of two ways, depending on
whether the defendant is dangerous. First, the government can seek
to medicate a dangerous defendant in what is called a Harper4
hearing. This is the simpler method because "the inquiry . . . is
usually more 'objective and manageable,"' 5 and the Supreme Court
has held that an elevated standard is not needed in this kind of
inquiry. 6 Second, the government can seek to forcibly medicate a
nondangerous defendant for the sole purpose of restoring
competency to stand trial. This second situation is called a Self
inquiry and is the focus of the Ruiz-Gaxiola case.

l. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,221 (1990).
2. "(E)vcry circuit to address the issue has concluded that the government must bear
the burden of proving the relevant facts [in a Sell inquiry] by clear and convincing evidence."
United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 692 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v.
Bush, 585 F.3d 806,814 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591,598 (3d Cir.
2008); United States v. Payne, 539 F.3d 505, 508-09 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1114 (lOth Cir. 2005); United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 160
(2d Cir. 2004)).
3. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 691-92.
4. !d. at 689. A Harper hearing is an analysis that revolves around a balancing of the
interests in protecting the public and the defendant from the danger that the defendant poses
in his unmedicated state. The Supreme Court believes this to be an easier, more concrete test
than that of a Sell hearing, which involves more abstract and metaphysical concepts like trial
fairness and competence. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 182 (2003).
5. Sell, 539 U.S. at 182 (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 140 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)).
6. Harper, 494 U.S. at 235.
7. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 700.
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In United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, defendant Vincente RuizGaxiola was charged with unlawful reentry and was found to be
incompetent to stand trial due to a rare mental disorder. 8 He refused
medication that was intended to restore his competency, and the
district court ordered that he be forcibly medicated. 9 On review, the
Ninth Circuit held that the government had not proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the proposed treatment was medically
appropriate or that it would significantly further the government's
prosecutorial interest. 10
The court's decision was correct, but it missed an opportunity to
simplifY applying these decisions by closing the door on Sell inquiries
in situations in which defendants arc accused of nonserious crimes.
The court should have determined that the government never has an
important enough interest in prosecuting nonviolent individuals to
justifY forcible medication; the goals of prosecution and punishment
either cannot be accomplished with these types of defendants or will
be accomplished better by some other means that do not require
forced administration of antipsychotic drugs.
Part II of this Note gives a short background on the law of
forced medication, followed by a discussion of the facts and analysis
of the Ruiz-Gaxiola case. Part III explains the retributivist and
utilitarian rationales for punishment and discusses why these
justifications may not apply to defendants who are found to be
incompetent. Part IV discusses the more humane alternatives that
can accomplish these utilitarian goals. Part V concludes.
II. RUIZ-GAXIOLA AND THE LAW OF FORCED MEDICATION

A. The Cases Up Through Sell
It is a violation of due process to convict a mentally incompetent
person. 11 The standard for competency to stand trial requires that a
person have "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and [that] he [have]

8.
9.
10.
11.
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Id.
Id.
See

at 687.
at 687-88.
at 706-07.
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375,378 (1966).
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a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him. " 12
Prosecutors and courts have adopted different methods of
restoring a defendant to a level of competency that would allow him
to stand trial. In some cases, they have attempted to commit the
defendant to a mental health ward, even though the defendant was
not dangerous, in an effort to restore him to competency. 13 These
commitments were often indefinite and would sometimes extend
well beyond the statutory-maximum sentence of the alleged crime. 14
The Supreme Court invalidated these indefinite commitments
because they were based solely on a defendant's incompetence to
stand trial. 1" If a defendant is held in an institution to restore him to
competency, he can only be held for a reasonable period of time
necessary to determine "whether there is a substantial chance of his
attaining the capacity to stand trial in the foreseeable fl1ture." 16 If the
state does not determine that a person would regain competence,
then it must undertake a standard civil commitment to continue to
hold the defendant. 17
With the advent and increased efficacy of antipsychotic
medication, it became simpler to restore defendants to competency
by administering these drugs. Most early cases held that it was
permissible to medicate criminal defendants to make them
competent to stand trial. 18 This trend is explained somewhat by a
common perception among courts that "the administ[ ration] of
drugs under proper medical supervision has effectively restored many
mentally ill citizens to a useful life in which they can function as
normally as other citizens not so impaired. " 1Y This misperception ran
12. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 ( 1960).
13. See, c.._q., Jackson v. Indiana,406 U.S. 715,719 (1972).
14. Said. at 717-19. In Jack.ron P. Indiana, the defendant had bet·n indicted on two
counts of robbery involving less than $10, and he spent three-and-a-half years in involuntary
institutionalization. MICHAEL L. PERU~ ET AL., COMPETENCE !~ THE LAW: !:'ROM LEGAL
THEORY TO CL!~!CAL APPLIC:ATIO~ 60-61 (200R).
15. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 720.
16. !d. at 733.
17. !d. at 73R.
18. Sec, eg., People v. Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d 7R7, 794 (Mich. Ct. App. 19R4); State v.
Hayes, 3R9 A.2d 1379, 13R2 (N.H. 197R); State v. Law, 244 S.E.2d 302, 307 (S.C. 197R);
State v. Stacy, 556 S.W.2d 552, 553 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977); Craig v. State, 704 S.W.2d
94R, 950 (Tex. Ct. App. 19R6 ); State v. Lover, 707 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
19. PERLIN ET AL, supra note 14, at 34 (quoting Stacy, 556 S.W.2d at 557-58)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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contrary to the understanding that common side effects of these
drugs turned defendants into drooling, sedated shells of their former
selves. 20
Courts eventually grew into the understanding that defendants
had a "significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted
administration of antipsychotic drugs. " 21 The Supreme Court began
its major development of the law of forced administration in
Washington v. HarpeY- 2 and Riggins v. Nevada. 23 In Harper, the
Court approved forced administration on prison inmates that were
mentally ill and either were severely disabled or posed "a likelihood
of serious harm" to themselves, others, or their property. 24 In
Riggins, the Court reversed the ddendant's capital conviction
because the state court had refused to allow him to discontinue his
use of antipsychotic medication during his trial. 25 The Court found
that without an "overriding justification" for forcible medication, the
government could not overcome the liberty interest in avoiding
unwanted medication-an interest that requires at least as much
protection in pretrial detainees as in inmates. 26 The Court did not
reach the question whether forcible medication could be continued if
discontinuation would result in the defendant's incompetence. 27
The Court first reached this question in Sell v. United States. 2 ~
Charles Sell, a dentist who had a history of mental illness, was
accused of insurance fraud. 29 After Sell was found to be incompetent
to stand trial, he was hospitalized for treatment but refused
antipsychotic medications against the staff's recommendation. 30 After
several hearings in different judicial and quasi-judicial venues, the
Supreme Court agreed to consider whether the government could
forcibly medicate Sell to restore his competency to stand trial:' 1

20. Id. at 150.
21. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,221 (1990).
22. Id.
23. Rigginsv.Nevada,504U.S.127(1992).
24. Harper, 494 U.S. at 210,215.
25. R(q_qins, 504 U.S. at 129.
26. Id.at135.
27. Id. at 136.
28. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
29. ld. at 169-70.
30. Id. at 171.
31. Id. at 171-75. The decision passed first from a reviewing psychiatrist that approved
tixciblc medication because of Sell's dangerousness and incompetence, to the Medical Center's
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The Court held that "the Constitution allows the Government
to administer [antipsychotic] drugs, even against the defendant's
will, in limited circumstances. " 32 The Court reasoned that the
government can administer antipsychotic drugs against the
defendant's will if four conditions arc satisfied. 33 A court must
conclude that (I) "important governmental interests are at stake;" 34
( 2) "involuntary medication will significantly further those
concomitant state interests; " 3 s ( 3) "involuntary medication is
necessary to further those interests; " 36 ( 4) "administration of the
drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient's best medical
interest in light of his medical condition. " 37 The Court indicated that
this inquiry was intended for situations in which the government is
seeking forced medication solely to render the defendant competent
to stand trial. 3B A diff-erent inquiry would apply in situations in which
the defendant either is dangerous to himself or others, or he is at risk
of suffering grave health problems. 39
Since 2003, the framework established in the Sell decision has
been the guiding analysis used in cases regarding nondangerous
criminal defendants who refuse antipsychotic medication. 40

administrative review that found that Sell was dangerous and that medical intervention was the
strategy most likely to restore Sell to competency. Next, the kderal magistrate reviewed the
findings of the administrative review board and found that Sell was a danger to himself and
others, <111d that antipsychotic medication was the only way to make him less dangerous. This
decision was then reviewed by the district court, which found that Sell was not dangerous but
upheld the order to f(>rcibly medicate him to serve the government's compelling interest in
prosecuting him. Finally, a divided panel of the court of appeals atlirmcd the district court's
holding. The court of appeals also t(mnd that Sell was not dangerous but that the
government's interest in prosecution was sufficient to overcome Sell's interest in avoiding
unwanted medication.
32. Id. at 16':!.
33. Id. at 169, 17':!-81.
.34. Id. at 180 .
35. Id.at181.
36. !d.
37. I d.
38. I d.
3':!. ld.at182.
40. Sa United States v. Ruiz-(3axiob, 623 F.3d 684, 6':!2 (9th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Bush, 585 !:'.3d 806,814 (4th Cir. 200':!); United States\'. Grape, 549 F.3d 591,598
(3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Payne, 53<) !:'.3d 505,508-09 (6th Cir. 2008); United States
v. Bradley, 417 !:'.3d 1107, 1114 (lOth Cir. 2005); United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157,
160 (2d Cir. 2004).
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Ruiz was arrested for unlawful reentry, and before trial he was
diagnosed with a rare mental illness that rendered him incompetent
to stand trial. 42 Under the admonition in Sell, 43 the magistrate judge
first conducted a Harper hearing to sec whether forcible medication
was justified because of grave health risk or dangerousness. 44 Finding
that Ruiz did not meet either of these criteria, the federal magistrate
conducted a Sell inquiry to see whether the defendant met the four
requirements for forcible medication. 4 " With the help of expert
witnesses who testified in opposite directions about every Sell factor,
the federal magistrate concluded that Ruiz's situation met all four of
the Sell requirements and recommended that Ruiz be forcibly
medicated, despite Ruiz's objcctions. 46 The district court adopted
the federal magistrate's recommendation, and Ruiz appealed to the
Ninth Circuit. 47
Before moving to the merits of the case, the court of appeals
discussed the language in the governing Supreme Court cases calling
for an "overriding justification," 48 requmng protection of a
"significant liberty interest," 49 and allowing forcible medication only
in "limited circumstances. " 50 Additionally, the court of appeals
considered relevant precedent from its jurisdiction reasoning that this
language demonstrated a "reluctance to permit involuntary
medication except in rare circumstanccs" 51 because of the "errorprone analysis" 52 of a Sell inquiry. 53 The Ninth Circuit ultimately

41. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 f.3d at 691-92.
42. Id. at 688-89.
43. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 182.
44. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 f.3d at 689.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 690.
47. Id.
48. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992).
49. Washington v·. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,221 (1990).
50. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003 ); Jee Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 f.3d at
691-92.
51. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 691 (quoting United States v. Rivcra-Guerrcro, 426
F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. Id. at 692 (quoting United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908, 915 (9th
Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Id.
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decided to require the government to meet a "clear and convincing
evidence" standard to satisfy each of the Sell requirements. 54
Moving on to the merits, the Ninth Circuit considered the first
Sell requirement "that important governmental interests are at
stake. " 55 The court reasoned that "[ t ]he Government's interest in
bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime is
important." 56 As the Supreme Court had stated, this serious crime
could be either "a serious crime against the person or a serious crime
against property." 57 In addition to the "seriousness" of the crime,
the court of appeals weighed "the specific circumstances" of Ruiz's
case, including the following: the guideline range for the crime of
which he was accused; the likelihood that he would commit this
crime again; the length of time he had already been confined; and
the possibility that he would be committed if unable to proceed to
trial. 58 Applying these factors, the court of appeals held that the
lower court did not err in determining that the government had an
important interest in prosecuting Ruiz for his crime of unlawful
reentry. 59 The court of appeals reached this conclusion, despite the
fact that this "crime is neither against persons nor property," and
that Ruiz had already been confined for forty-seven months. 60
The second Sell requirement is that the government must
establish that "involuntary medication will significantly further its
interest in prosecuting the defendant for the charged offense." 61 To
demonstrate this, the government must prove that the drugs are
"substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand
trial," and that the drugs are "substantially unlikely to have side
effects that will interfere significantly with the defendant's ability to
assist counsel in conducting a trial defense. " 62 The court of appeals
criticized the federal magistrate and the district court for concluding
that this requirement was satisfied; they based their conclusion on

54.
55.
quotation
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id. at 691 (quoting Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003)) (internal

marks omitted).
Id. at 693 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 180) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 693~95.
Jd.at695.
Id.
I d. (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 181) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 181) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the treating physician stating that the proposed medical regimen was
"designed" to satisfY the second Sell prong. 63 Because enhanced
tactual findings were unlikely to be made on remand, the Ninth
Circuit chose to resolve the question with what was available in the
record. 64 The court delved into the testimony and evidence offered
by both ~ides about these factors. 65 On the one hand, the
government had presented only two studies and a practice guideline
that were either effectively discredited or contained inapplicable
extrapolations. 66 On the other hand, the defense had presented
"multiple scientific studies" that the government did not even
attempt to discredit. 67 The court stated that the government could
not meet its burden of clear and convincing evidence by "rely[ing]
on generalities and fail[ ing] to apply [its] views to Ruiz 's condition
with specificity. " 68 The court of appeals held that the government
failed to satisfY the second Sell factor. 69
The third Sell requirement is that "the government must
establish 'that involuntary medication is necessary to further' its
interest in prosecuting the defendant. " 70 This requirement depends
upon a positive finding of the second Sell requirement because a
proposed treatment cannot be necessary to further the government's
interest unless it significantly furthers the government's interest in
the flrst place. 71 This failing alone was sufficient to lead the court of
appeals to hold that the district court clearly erred in flnding that the
government had fulfilled the third Sell factor. 72 Still, the court went
to the trouble to draw attention to some "extremely troubling"
reasoning on the part of the district court. 73 The district court
rejected the defense expert's proposed alternative treatment solely
because the expert had spent less time observing and interviewing
the defendant than the government had. 74 This was disturbing
63. Id. at 696.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 696-700.
66. Id. at 700.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 701.
70. Id. (quoting Sell\'. United States, 539 U.S. 166, !Sl (2003)).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 701,703.
73. Id. at 702.
74. Id.
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because it is common for a government expert to have much more
access to the defendant than a defense expert because the
government is housing the defendant and providing his ongoing
medical treatment? 5
The fourth part of the Sell test allows a court to authorize
involuntary medication only if "administration of the drugs is
medically appropriate. " 76 This requires that the drugs be "in the
patient)s best medical interest in light of his medical condition. " 77
The court of appeals explained that this inquiry is similar to that of
the second requirement, except that it is expanded to include "those
consequences [of the treatment] that may not affect the defendant's
trial in any way." 78 This focus on the overall welfare of the
defendant-patient "reflects the importance of the liberty interests at
stake in an involuntary medication order. " 79 The court of appeals
considered the same evidence it used to analyze the second
requirement and held that the government had failed to fulfill this
fourth Sell requirement. 80
The court of appeals reversed the order for f(xced administration
of antipsychotic medication because the district court erred 111
finding that the government had met the last three Sell factors. 81
III. WHY THE COURTS Do NOT NEED TO UNDERTAKE THE
EXTENSIVE SELL INQUIRY

The Sell test was designed to apply to incompetent defendants
accused of "serious, but nonviolent, crimes." 82 Being incompetent
typically means that the defendant fails to understand even the
nature of the proceedings against him. 83 If the defendant's mental
capacity is diminished to that extent, the goals of prosecution and
punishment will not be satisfied. Section A discusses how, under
retributive theory, a defendant with diminished mental capacity is

75.
76.
quotation
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 703 (quoting Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003)) (internal
marks omitted).
Id. (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 181) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 704.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 705-07.
Id. at 707.
Sell, 539 U.S. at 169.
See the discussion of the Dusky standard, supra Part II.A.
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not "culpable" and therefore not deserving of punishment. Section B
discusses how, under utilitarian theory, none of the usual "greater
goods" that punishment accomplishes can be achieved with
incompetent criminal defendants. Accordingly, if incompetent
criminal defendants refuse antipsychotic medication, courts should
be able to dispose of their cases without the detailed, fact-specific
inquiry required by the Sell test.

A. The Failure of the Retributivist Rationale in Punishing
Incompetent Defendants
"The retributive theory of justice holds that 'the punishment of
crime is right in itself, that it is fitting that the guilty should suffer,
and that justice, or the moral order, requires the institution of
punishment. "' 84 According to retributivists, people "should be
proportion
to
their
blameworthiness." 85
punished
in
Blameworthiness is composed of two factors: the seriousness of the
crime and the culpability of the offender. 86 Culpability is made up of
an actor's intent and capacity to conform to the law. 87 These factors
help to explain why so little societal blame is attached to adults
failing to use turn signals ( nonserious crime), adults getting into
auto accidents (no intent), and minors committing offenses (reduced
capacity).
As far as the seriousness of the crime, the other ingredient of
blameworthiness, the Sell analysis applies only to incompetent
defendants accused of "serious, but nonviolent, crimes. " 88 Though
the Supreme Court has stated that bringing a person accused of a
serious crime to trial is an important interest, 89 the justifications for

84. Louis K1plow & Steven Shavell, F11irnesJ Verms Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961,
1228 (2001) (quoting Stanley I. Benn, Punishment, in 7 THE E~C:YCI.OPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 29,30 (Paul Edwards cd., 1967)).
85. RichardS. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REv. 67, 73 (2005 ).
86. Id.
87. Id. W.H. Walsh interprets Hegel to mean that an olfcndcr deserves punishment only
if he "knows what he is doing and so commits himself to accepting the consequences of his act,
including punishment if his crime is detected." W. H. WALSH, HEGELIAN ETHICS 68 ( 1969).
88. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003).
89. Id. at 180. What constitutes a "serious crime" is a much-disputed question. Some
look to sentencing guidelines, which are used to determine what a "serious crime" is for
purposes of mandating a jury trial. Others look to the language in Sell concerning crimes
against property and crimes against the person. This topic is ably covered in Stewart B.
Harman, Restoration of Competency Through Involuntary Medication: Applying the Sell Factors,
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forgoing a Sell inquiry do not depend on whether the defendant is
accused of a serious crime.\) 0
The measures of culpability tor the mentally incompetent are all
necessarily reduced. First, the formation of intent requires an
understanding of consequences and an idea of desired outcomes. 91
The failure of the mentally incompetent to meet this requirement of
culpability is at the heart of the justification for the insanity
defense. 92 This inability to form the requisite intent is also linked to
the second factor: capacity to conform to the law. As with intent, a
mentally incompetent person has a reduced capacity to conform to
the law because he is not rational. 93 Because the mentally
incompetent defendant has a reduced capacity to conform to the law
and to form a requisite intent, he is less culpable and less
blameworthy in the eyes of retributivists.
The retributivist rationale for punishment does not support
punishing mentally incompetent defendants. Unless the government
can find other justifications for its "important" interest in
prosecuting and punishing nondangerous, mentally incompetent
defendants, the Sell test is unnecessary.

B. The Failure of the Several Utilitarian Rationales in Punishing
Incompetent Defendants
Utilitarianism seeks the overall maximization of good or
pleasure, and justifies the use of punishment (a bad) to accomplish

4 APPALACHIA:--; ].L. 127, 133-38 (2005 ).
90. Seriousness of a crime is necessary lc>r blameworthiness, but it is not sufficient.
Because an incompetent defendant cannot meet the other necessary requirement, culpability, it
does not matter whether he is accused of a serious crime. for the purposes of this article, I
assume that incompetent dctendants face a Sell hearing only if they have committed a serious
crime.
91. I GEORGE DALE COLLINSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW CONCER>IING IDIOTS,
LUI':ATICS, AND OTHER PERSONS NON COMPOTES MENTIS 671 (London, W. Reed, 1812)
("Such a man, so destitute of all power of judgment, could have no intention at all.").
92. S. SHELDO:--; GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 109 ( 1927)
("The defense of criminal irresponsibility by reason of insanity is ... but a specific instance of
the more general legal proposition, that no person can be held criminally liable and punishable
tor an illegal act, unless he has, as it is sometimes put, 'sufticient mental capacity' to 'entertain
a criminal intent,' or to have a mens rea, or 'guilty mind."' (footnote omitted)).
93. See IGOR P!UMORATZ, )LTSTIHING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 79 (1989) (describing
rationality as a ti.mdamental trait of humans that is necessary tor culpability because a person
that lacks rationality is a slave to his animal-like impulses rather than a conscious being
choosing his own path).
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greater good. 94 This greater good is most frequently accomplished
through one of tlve possible mechanisms: "rehabilitation,
incapacitation, specific deterrence, general deterrence, and
denunciation. " 95 Each of these is either entirely ineflective with
mentally incompetent offenders or is better accomplished through
other available methods aside from a criminal conviction.
Rehabilitation is likely to be more effective with mentally
incompetent individuals than with sane criminals who have
intentionally and freely committed antisocial acts. 96 However, the
condemnatory and antagonistic approach of a criminal trial and
conviction followed by incarceration is not an effective means of
rehabilitation, regardless of the mental state of the accused. 97 It
would be more effective to enroll the accused m a treatment
program that docs not require medication or to pursue
commitment. 98
Incapacitation is accomplished by keeping the offender from
general society and preventing him from harming society with his
criminal acts. 99 This method of crime prevention is just as dlective
with the mentally ill as with the mentally well; both can be "kept
away" in the same manner. One difference is that the mentally ill can
be removed from society by civil commitment in order to protect the
person, to protect society, or to care for a person that is severely
disabled. 100 This incapacitation through commitment is preferable to
incarceration because of the benefits of possible rehabilitation and
more humane treatment of defendants who refuse medication. 101

94. I d. at 15-18 (describing the utilitarian judgment of actions based solely on the
consequences of pleasure or suffering they bring about).
95. Frase, sup1-a note 85, at 70.
96. See id. ("Rehabilitation ... assumes that the otlender has identifiable and tre.1tabk
problems which cause him to commit crimes.").
97. Sec Helen M. Annis, Treatment in Correctiom: Martinson Was Right, 22 CAN.
PSYCHO!.. 321, 321-22, 325 ( 1981) t()r a survey of studies concluding that incarceration of
defendants is an indkctive means of rehabilitation.
98. See Crystal Mueller & A. Michael Wvlie, Examining the Ej]Cctivencss of tm
Inten,ention Designed for the Restoration of Competency to Stand Trial, 25 BEHAV. Sci. & L.
891, 892-94 ( 2007) (identifYing the strengths and weaknesses of studies used to support the
use of medication to restore competency and outlining alternative competency restoration
methods).
99. PRIMORATZ, supra note 93, at 19-20.
100. PERLIN ET AI.., supra note 14, at 134-35.
101. PRIMORATZ, supra note 93, at 24-25 (noting that one of the t()Lir limits of
punishment that utilitarians subscribe to is needlessness, and that this is a limiting factor when
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Mentally incompetent persons have such a reduced rational
capacity that it makes the possibility of specific deterrence entirely
nonexistent. 102 Not only are a mentally incompetent defendant's
motivations not influenced by experiencing his own punishment, but
also he is not affected by seeing other mentally ill defendants
punished. Thus, general deterrence is as ineffective as specific
deterrence. Denunciation involves broad societal enforcement
through means of societal cues and social norms. 103 An inability to
perceive, let alone understand, social norms is a characteristic of
incompetence, 104 which would make the effort of reducing crime
commissions by the mentally ill by means of denunciation completely
incfJective.
Like the retributivist rationale, the utilitarian rationale tor
punishment fails to justifY punishment of mentally incompetent
defendants. Without an underlying justification or purpose, the
government cannot demonstrate that it has an "important" interest
in prosecuting and punishing nondangerous mentally incompetent
defendants.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO FORCIBLE MEDICATION
Undoubtedly the government has an interest in accomplishing
the purposes behind prosecution and punishment of criminal
defendants. 105 When an incompetent defendant refuses medication
that would possibly restore his competence, the prosecution and
punishment of this defendant is hindered. The purposes behind
prosecution and punishment, however, can be accomplished by
means that do not require forced medication of the incompetent

the goals of the punishment can he accomplished by other means that are either more effective
or less costly).
. [The punishment]
102. !d. at 24 ("[I Jnsane persons ought not to be punished
cannot ctliciently prevent future ofknses.").
103. !:'rase, supra note 85, at 72.
104. According to the Dusky standard, an incompetent defendant lacks a rational
understanding of the proceedings against him that would allow him to assist in his defense. If a
person is incapahlc of rational understanding of such an important event as a criminal
proceeding against him, then he is unlikely to have a significant appreciation of something as
subtle as social norms. Also, fix many mental illnesses that contribute to incompetence, an
inahility to perceive and contiJrm to social norms is a diagnostic feature. E.g., AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., DIM;NOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 01' MDITAL DISORDERS 285
(4th cd. 1994) (listing the diagnostic characteristics of schizophrenia).
105. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).
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defendant. Among the available options, two will be discussed
below: imputed election of a nonmedication treatment plan and civil
commitment.

A. Imputed Election of a Nonmedication Treatment Plan
Suppose an incompetent defendant has been lawfully arrested
and is legally being held in anticipation of his pending criminal trial.
When he is found to be incompetent, his trial will be postponed
pending restoration of his competence. Medication is often favored
by the courts, the government, and the defendant because it can
restore competence more quickly than other forms of treatment 106
and facilitate a speedy trial. If a defendant chooses to avoid the side
effects of antipsychotic pharmaceuticals by refusing medication, then
he could be deemed to have chosen to undergo an alternative
program designed to restore competency without medication. 107
Though it may take longer, 108 such an alternative program may be
equally effective in restoring the defendant to competency to stand
trial. 109
If the defendant's refusal of medication were imputed to him as
by election, it would accomplish the same objectives as pursuing a
forcible medication order and proceeding with prosecution. If the
defendant is not restored to competency, this treatment and holding
period incapacitate the defendant, provide a means of rehabilitation,
and act as a specific or general deterrent (insofar as deterrents can be
effective with the mentally incompetent) against refusing medication
because of the longer pretrial incarceration. If the defendant's
competency is restored, the government would be able to proceed
with the trial just as it would if it forcibly medicated the defendant.
The main difference is that with the treatment and holding period,
the government does not have to deprive the defendant of his
significant liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medication.

106. Stephen J. Morse, Involuntary Competence, 21 BEHAV. Scr. & L. 311,316 (2003)
("[A]ntipsychotic medication ... [provides] the most etlicient means to restore a psychotic
defendant's competence, although not the only means.").
107. These alternative methods include legal-concept teaching with a cognitiveproblem-solving approach and other therapies focused on restoring rationality and increased
sense of reality. Mueller & Wylie, supra note 98, at 894.
108. See Morse, supra note 106.
109. See Mueller & Wylie, supra note 98, at 893-94. The literature is a bit thin on
studies testing the effectiveness of alternative methods in restoring competency.
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B. Civil Commitment

In addition to being a fallback for defendants that foreseeably
cannot be restored to competency, 110 the government could pursue
civil commitment in cases in which incompetent defendants refuse
medication. Civil commitment would accomplish all the goals that a
traditional punishment accomplishes with the mentally ill. As
discussed above, 111 traditional punishment is only effective at
incapacitation of mentally ill defendants. Civil commitment is equally
effective at incapacitation, and it has the added benefit of promoting
rehabilitation better than incarceration. 112 One wrinkle in this option
is that most states require that a person be dangerous to be
committed.m And if a defendant is dangerous, a court will never
reach a Sell inquiry. 114 However, many states also allow commitment
for people who are unable to care for themselves. 115 Competence to
stand trial is such a low standard of capacity that incompetent
defendants could well meet the standard for commitment due to
inability to care for oneself. u 6 This commitment would accomplish
the goal of incapacitation, and perhaps rehabilitation, without the
government needing to deprive the defendant of the significant
liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medication.
V. CONCLUSION

Because the objectives behind prosecution and punishment arc
not met with nondangerous, mentally incompetent criminal
defendants, the government cannot be said to have an "important"
interest in bringing the defendant to trial. The government should
employ more humane means-means that do not require forced
medication-to reach these objectives. Because the government
cannot show that it has an "important" interest in prosecuting these

110. Id. at 738.
111. Supra Part lll.B.
112. See Annis, supra note 97; Mueller & Wylie, supra note 98, at 893-94.
113. PERLIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 139-42. The issue of dangerousness is
troublesome because of its inconsistent and broadly divergent interpretation within and among
ditlerent states. 1t is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss this issue further, but this is an
area in need of much thought, refi:>rm, and a consistent standard.
114. Sell v. United States 539 U.S. 166, 181-82 (2003).
115. PERLIN ETAL., .rupra note 14, at 143-47.
116. See discussion of the Dusky standard for competence in Part II.A.
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defendants, the Sell test cannot be met and the courts should no
longer authorize forced medication of nondangerous, mentally
incompetent defendants.

Adam Dayton*

* ].D. candidate, April 2013, ]. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University.
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